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This paper establishes the generalization that whenever agreement with the finite verb is
controlled by a constituent that is not in a Spec–Head relation with the inflectional head
of the clause, this agreement cannot affect person. A syntactic representation for person
inside the noun phrase and on the clausal spine is proposed which, in conjunction with
the workings of agreement and concord, accommodates this empirical generalization
and derives Baker’s Structural Condition on Person Agreement. The proposal also
provides an explanation for the ϕ-feature agreement facts of specificational copular
sentences. The paper places its findings on person vs. number agreement in the context
of recent psycho- and neuro-linguistic investigation of number/person dissociation.
Keywords: agreement, person, number, agreement attraction, long-distance agreement, relativization,
specificational copular sentences, concord
INTRODUCTION
Agreement remains a highly complex matter, empirically as well as theoretically. With particular
reference to agreement in specificational copular sentences, various ‘agreement attraction’, and
long-distance agreement constructions, this paper addresses the question of why agreement
phenomena systematically make a distinction between person and the other ϕ-features. Baker’s,
(2008, 2011) Structural Condition on Person Agreement (SCOPA) was formulated to account for
this, but by itself it offers no explanation for it. After a survey of the empirical territory I devote the
core of the paper to deriving SCOPA and its effects from the syntactic representation of person in
the noun phrase (as a specifier of the number phrase) and on the clausal spine (as a functional head
in the complement of the number head), and from the workings of agreement and concord.
I close the paper by placing the findings regarding the difference in behavior between number
and person agreement in the context of the recent psycho- and neuro-linguistic literature on
number/person dissociation. Significant differences in behavior have been found between number
agreement and person agreement in a suite of psycho- and neuro-linguistic studies — especially
those conducted by Mancini and her co-workers on various Romance languages (see Mancini
et al., 2011 for ERP experiments, Mancini et al., 2014b for self-paced reading experiments,
and Mancini et al., 2017 for an event-related fMRI experiment). In their 2011 study on the
ERP patterns evinced by subject-verb agreement violations in Spanish, number and person
were found to differ in two ways: (a) person agreement violations give rise to N400 effects,
which are ‘seldom reported in the literature’ (p. 69) for ‘mere’ agreement mismatches; and (b)
person but not number agreement violations produce an early increased P600 effect at frontal
(rather than posterior) sites. Mancini and colleagues interpret the frontal P600 effect as a
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reflex of ‘discourse-related integration difficulties’ (p. 73),
and reinforce the semantic-pragmatic role played by person
agreement by their understanding of the N400 effect (usually
associated with problems of interpretation) as an indication that
person mismatch causes an interruption of ‘the establishment of
interpretive relations among constituents’ (p. 72) — particularly,
of the association of the morphosyntactic person marking with
the representation of the discourse participant (speaker/hearer)
in the left periphery of the clause.
Mancini et al. (2017) recast their findings in terms of the
postulation of two different mechanisms involved in agreement
phenomena, which they call ‘feature-checking’ and ‘feature-
mapping.’ Number and person agreement are argued to involve
a common ϕ-feature-checking mechanism but to differ in their
feature-mapping options, with number mapping to cardinality
and person to the discourse. The present paper bears marginally
on feature-mapping (the interpretive side of number and person
marking), in its discussion of number agreement between the
relativized head and the finite verb of a relative clause. But the
main impact of this paper lies in what it has to say regarding
Mancini and colleagues conclusion that number and person
agreement share the same feature-checking mechanism. The
material reviewed in this paper argues for a key difference
between the feature-checking processes involved in number and
person agreement: number agreement is possible under both
Agree and the Spec–Head relation; person agreement, on the
other hand, cannot transpire under (downward) Agree, being
establishable only in a Spec–Head configuration.
PERSON IS DIFFERENT
Agreement in Specificational Copular
Sentences
Specificational Pseudoclefts
It is often said that copula agreement distinguishes neatly and
reliably between the predicational and specificational readings of
pseudoclefts of the type in (1): Declerck (1988, p. 79), the source
of these particular examples, asserts that (1a) is unambiguously
specificational, and (1b) is predicational.1
1Declerck (1988, p. 79) also claims that the copula of a specificational pseudocleft
cannot agree with the focus when this focus is an NPI, as in (i) (reproduced with
Declerck’s judgments). But pseudoclefts with NPI-connectivity can be found for
which at least some speakers allow for number agreement between the copula and
the focus. The examples in (ii) (with (iic) taken from the internet) illustrate. (Here
and throughout this paper, ‘!’ marks ‘unusual agreement.’)
(i) what the book does not offer {is/∗are} any solutions to the problems
that are noted
(ii) (a) what nobody has bought {is/!are} any cups and glasses
(b) what isn’t available {is/!are} papers that say anything about clefts
(c) what nobody has seen are any of the bonuses (including playmats,




In the analysis of NPI-connectivity in specificational pseudoclefts presented in Den
Dikken et al. (2000), the examples in (i)–(ii) have as their post-copular constituent
a full clause stripped down to the focus. If this is to involve constituent ellipsis (as
(1)(a) what you have bought is fake jewels
(b) what you have bought are fake jewels
But while it is true that (1a) only supports a specificational
reading (equivalent to you have bought fake jewels), (1b) is not
quite as unambiguous as Declerck makes it out to be. Similarly,
in what John brought was/? were the crackers, plural inflection on
the copula is (marginally) possible on a specificational reading
of the pseudocleft. Declerck (1988, pp. 79–80) himself points out
that ‘[i]n specificational sentences the number of the copula can
apparently be determined by that of either the superficial subject
NP or the variable NP.’ The examples in (2a,b) are from Declerck,
with his judgments (or those of his informants) provided; the
ones in (2c–e) I have taken from Heycock (2012), with her
original judgments included (see also Den Dikken, 2017).
(2)(a) what I need {is/??are} more books
(b) what we can’t have here {is/?are} theft and robbery
(c) what he saw behind him {was/were} two men
(d) what makes something a pencil are superficial
characteristics such as a certain form and function
(e) all I could see {was/were} two staring eyes
No such oscillation is found for person, however: the
sentences in (3) (also due to Heycock, 2012) are ungrammatical
with person agreement between the copula and the post-
copular focus.
(3)(a) what he saw behind him {was/∗were} you
(b) what makes this party go {is/∗are} you
(c) all I could see {was/∗were} you
This is our first indication that number and person should be
treated distinctly in the morphosyntax of English.
effects of Merchant’s, 2001 P-stranding generalization in Dutch cases of this type
suggest it must), we are dealing with a case of non-wh sluicing (IP ellipsis), with
the focused constituent in the left periphery of the answer clause:
(iii) [TopP [Question what nobody bought] [Top′ Top = be [Answer any cups
and glassesi [IP nobody bought t i]]]]
On this analysis, (i)–(ii) remind us of long-distance agreement in Tsez (Polinsky
and Potsdam, 2001) and several other languages [incl. Innu-aimûn (Branigan and
MacKenzie, 2002), Passamaquoddy (Bruening, 2001), and Itelmen (Bobaljik and
Wurmbrand, 2005)]. The example in (ivb) illustrates long-distance agreement in
Tsez:




‘the mother knows that they boy ate the bread’




Polinsky and Potsdam (2001) argue that long-distance agreement in Tsez
necessarily involves movement to an A′–position in the high left periphery of the
subordinate clause — specifically, in the case of Tsez, SpecTopP, as in (v). The
syntactic relationship between V and the lower topic in (v) is fully parallel to the
relation between be and the lower focus in (iii).
(v) V [LowerClause magalui [IP uža¯ ti ba¯c’rułi]]
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Double-NP Specificational Copular Sentences
In English double-NP specificational copular sentences such as
(4)–(5), the copula agrees with the precopular noun phrase for
both number and person (Heycock, 1992; Moro, 1997):2
(4) the biggest problem {is/∗are} the agreement facts
(5) the biggest problem {is/∗are} you
Dutch, German and Italian seem to return judgments that are
the exact opposite of the ones reported for English: in (6)–
(7), the copula must agree with the post-copular focus in both
number and person.
(6)(a) de oorzaak van het ongeluk {waren/∗was} kapotte
remmen (Dutch)
the cause of the accident were/was broken brakes
(b) die Unfallsursache {waren/∗war} defekte Bremsen
(German)
the accident-cause were/was defective brakes
(c) la causa della rivolta {sono/∗è} le foto del muro (Italian)
the cause of.the riot are/is the pictures of.the wall
(7)(a) de schuldige {ben/∗is} ik de schuldige {ben/∗is} jij
(Dutch)
the culprit am/is I the culprit are/is you
(b) der Schuldige {bin/∗ist} ich der Schuldige {bist/∗ist} du
(German)
the culprit am/is I the culprit are/is you
(c) il colpevole {sono/∗è} io il colpevole {sei/∗è} tu
(Italian)
the culprit am/is I the culprit are/is you
For Italian, these facts are systematic. Moro (1997), who first
discussed them in detail, has a syntax for them that makes
them fall out without causing trouble for any extant account
of agreement: la causa della rivolta in (6c) and il colpevole
in (7c) are base-generated as left-adjuncts to IP, with a pro-
predicate (pro) raising to the structural subject position; this pro
copies the ϕ-features of the referential noun phrase of which
it is predicated (i.e., the focus), so with I agreeing with pro we
automatically derive fullϕ-agreement with the post-copular focus
(8) makes this clear.
(8) [IP il colpevole [IP pro{ϕ}i [T′ COPULA{ϕ}i [SUBJECT{ϕ}i
(...)]]]]
The Dutch and German facts are more problematic — first
because (as Den Dikken, 1998 shows) they are not amenable to an
account along Moro’s (1997) lines; and secondly because they are
not nearly as straightforward as the Italian facts are. As a matter
of fact, the examples in (6a,b) and (7a,b) are a red herring. For
these root sentences, there are derivations available that treat the
sentence-initial noun phrase as a topic in the left periphery and
place the post-copular subject in the structural subject position,
2Occurrences of number agreement in double-NP specificational copular
sentences between the copula and the post-copular subject of predication are
nonetheless attested. The examples in (i) (from Frances, 1986, p. 315) present two
recorded cases of this type.
(i) (a) the weather to watch are those rains
(b) the cause of layoffs such as these are not the taxes
SpecIP. On such a derivation, the ϕ-agreement facts in (6a,b) and
(7a,b) are parallel to the ϕ-agreement found in (9), Verb Second
constructions with a non-subject in the left periphery and the
subject occupying the structural subject position and agreeing
with the finite verb.
(9)(a) op de vensterbank {staan/∗staat} twee vazen (Dutch)
on the window-sill stand.PL/stand.3SG two vases
(b) bananen {zul/∗zullen} je daar niet vinden
bananas will.2SG/will.PL you there not find
To avoid the confounding effect of Verb Second, we should
look at non-root clauses (which do not show Verb Second), as in
Dutch (10) and (11):
(10) ze denken/betwijfelen dat de oorzaak van het ongeluk
kapotte remmen {waren/∗was}
they think/doubt that the cause of the accident broken
brakes were/was
(11)(a) ze denken/betwijfelen dat de schuldige ik {∗ben/∗is}
they think/doubt that the culprit I am/is
(b) ze denken/betwijfelen dat de schuldige jij {∗bent/∗is}
they think/doubt that the culprit you are/is
The result is grammatical with number agreement but bad
with person agreement. In the case of (11) this yields ineffability:
with this linear order, I find that there is no ϕ-feature inflection
on the copula that comes out grammatical.3 To get a grammatical
output, we must refrain from predicate inversion, as in (11′),
which has person agreement between the subject pronoun and
the finite verb.
(11′)(a) ze denken/betwijfelen dat ik de schuldige {ben/∗is}
they think/doubt that I the culprit am/is
(b) ze denken/betwijfelen dat jij de schuldige {bent/∗is}
they think/doubt that you the culprit are/is
These facts present us with two questions: (i) why is person
agreement with the focus impossible when predicate inversion
takes place, and (ii) why is agreement with the inverted predicate
barred? Question (i) bears directly on the main theme of this
paper, and will be answered the section entitled “Why Person Is
Different.” The second question is strictly speaking tangential to
my concerns here — but for completeness’ sake, I will address it
briefly in the remainder of this section.
Heycock (2012):fn. (3) suggests that the oscillation between
singular and plural number inflection on the copula seen in (2),
repeated below, is ‘likely... due to the possibility of what and
all (or the empty noun it modifies) being underspecified for
3For sentences like dat het echte probleem jij/jullie___ ‘that the real problem you
(SG/PL) BE’, my own intuitions reveal that ineffability arises precisely where the
form of the copula is explicitly person-marked (present-tense 2SG bent vs 3SG is),
while the result is acceptable with forms that are syncretic for person (jij was and
jullie zijn/waren). Hartmann & Heycock’s (under review) experiments, revealing
no person or syncretism effects here, may not have been sufficiently fine-grained
to pick them up. These effects are perhaps even stronger in clefts (see also Ackema
and Neeleman, 2018, who report intuitions matching mine): dat het jij/jullie___
die S ‘that it you (SG/PL) BE who S’ works with was (for jij) and zijn/waren (for
jullie), but not with explicitly 2SG bent. Hereinafter, I will base myself on my own
judgements for Dutch.
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number,’ which she thinks allows them to pick up their number
specification from their associate (presumably under concord).
(2)(a) what I need {is/??are} more books
(b) what we can’t have here {is/?are} theft and robbery
(c) what he saw behind him {was/were} two men
(d) what makes something a pencil are superficial
characteristics such as a certain form and function
(e) all I could see {was/were} two staring eyes
Heycock’s parenthesis ‘or the empty noun it modifies’ points
us toward an answer to the question of why agreement with
the fronted predicate in (10)–(11) is impossible. In Den Dikken
(2006), it is proposed that in copular inversion constructions,
what raises to the structural subject position is consistently a
projection of a silent noun. Thus, double-NP copular inversion
sentences such as those in (10) and (11) have a syntax of the
following sort:
(12) [IP [PRED ∅ [the cause/culprit]]i [I′ I+RELATOR = be [RP
FOCUS [R′ tREL ti]]]]
With copular inversion constructions analyzed as in (12), the
fact that the copula cannot ϕ-agree with the fronted predicate in
(10)–(11) can be attributed to the absence of inherent ϕ-features
on the silent noun. The fact that in double-NP specificational
copular sentences such as my favorite authors are/∗is Austen and
Heller (from Heycock, 2009) we find plural inflection on the
copula follows from the silent noun’s ability to show number
concord (with either the conjoined subject of predication or
plural authors): the PERSONS who are my favorite authors are
Austen and Heller.4
Special Agreement and Person
Before moving on to the analysis the section entitled “Why
Person Is Different,” let me present a further set of contexts
in which person agreement behaves markedly differently from
number agreement: contexts that I will group together under the
rubric of ‘special agreement.’
Agreement Attraction
The variants of the sentences in (13) and (14) with a plural-
inflected finite verb (think, are) are well-known from the syntax
and psycholinguistics literature (see Kimball and Aissen, 1971 on
the former, and Bock and Miller, 1991 on the latter) as examples
of number agreement between the finite verb of the clause and the
‘wrong’ target: in each case, finite verb agreement fails to target
the entire subject of the clause; instead, agreement is ‘attracted’
to the relativized noun in (13) or to a subpart of the complex
subject noun phrase in (14) (modeled on examples given in
4For the text account, it is important that ‘∅’ not be taken to be pro (which is plainly
in possession of ϕ-features) but a silent noun (PERSON or THING, à la Kayne,
2005). See also Den Dikken and Griffiths (to appear) for relevant discussion.
The English equivalents of (10)–(11) do not give rise to ineffability, thanks to
the fact that English allows for default (3SG) inflection on the copula. Béjar and
Kahnemuyipour (2017) argue that in Eastern Armenian and Persian sentences of
the type the problem is the children, the copula has default inflection as well. In
Dutch this is impossible.
Kayne, 1998) — whence the name ‘agreement attraction’ [coined
for cases of the type in (14), but apt for (13) as well].5
(13)(a) the people who Clark {thinks/!think} are in the garden
(b) how many people {does/!do} Clark think are in the
garden?
(14)(a) the identity of these people {is/!are} to remain a secret
(b) these people’s identity {is/!are} to remain a secret
Like agreement in specificational copular sentences,
agreement of this type involves number, not person: person
agreement between the finite verb and a non-subject is
impossible in English:6
(15)(a) I, who Clark {is/∗am} hoping will marry his daughter
(b) you, who Clark {is/∗are} hoping will marry his daughter
(16)(a) the identity of me {is/∗am} to remain a secret
my identity {is/∗am} to remain a secret
(b) the identity of you {is/∗are} to remain a secret
your identity {is/∗are} to remain a secret
Long-Distance Agreement
Baker (2011, sect. 2.3.3) points out that the kind of long-distance
(cross-clausal) agreement found in Tsez (Polinsky and Potsdam,
2001; see fn. 1, above) likewise sets person apart — this time
not just from number but from gender as well. Baker brings
up the case of Loka¸a¸. In (17a), agreement between the matrix
predicate and the object of the gerund that serves as its subject
involves noun class (gender) and number; (17b) shows that such
long-distance agreement is impossible for person.
(17)(a) [e¸-sau ke.-de. i] e-tum e¸-tawa (Loka¸a¸)
7-fish GER/5-buy 7SG-be.very 7SG-be.difficult
‘buying fish is very difficult’
(b) ∗[min ke-funna] n-tum n-tawa
1SG GER/5-surprise 1SG-be.very 1SG-be.difficult
‘surprising me is very difficult’
5Dillon et al. (2017, p. 90) point out that the Kimball and Aissen effect [at least in
wh-questions, such as (13b)] ‘stands apart from other forms of attraction [such as
(14)], either in strength or in kind.’ In “Why Person Is Different,” it will turn out
that the syntax of the attraction configuration in (13) is also different in detail from
that in (14).
6Baker (2011) notes this for the Kimball and Aissen facts (15) (see also Dillon
et al., 2017, whose test items consistently feature a form of be as the agreeing
auxillary, pace Kayne, 2005, p. 264), and Nevins (2011) for ‘agreement attraction’
cases of the type in (16), both focusing on the first-person singular pronoun. I
gave examples with second-person you as well to avoid interference coming from
the case form of the pronoun — only me, not I, is possible in (4); and since
me is not nominative, it will experience more difficulty in controlling agreement
for independent reasons (see esp. Hartsuiker et al.’s, 2003 observation that the
rate of agreement attraction is highest in cases in which the attractor is explicitly
nominative or syncretic with the nominative). The second-person pronoun you
shows case syncretism for nominative and accusative, hence should in principle be
eligible for attracting agreement. The fact that it nonetheless fails to so do in (16b)
is therefore interesting and significant. In this connection, note also the Hungarian
examples in (i), where the possessive pronoun has the same form as the pronominal
subject of a finite clause (‘nominative,’ or absence of morphological case-marking),
yet person-agreement attraction remains sharply ungrammatical.
(i) (a) az én identitásom titok {volt/∗voltam} (Hungarian)
the I identity.1SG secret was(3SG)/was.1SG
(b) a te identitásod titok {volt/∗voltál}
the you identity.2SG secret was(3SG)/was.2SG
‘my/your identity was a secret’
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The facts in (13)–(17) solidify the conclusion reached in
“Agreement in Specificational Copular Sentences” on the basis
of the data of specificational copular sentences, and confirm the
existence of an important dichotomy within the set of ϕ-features,
setting person aside from the rest. The next section seeks to
explain this dichotomy.
WHY PERSON IS DIFFERENT
Structural Condition on Person
Agreement
Baker (2008, 2011) codifies the specialness of person agreement
as his SCOPA, reproduced in (18). Baker (2011, p. 877, fn. 3)
suggests (building on but modifying Franck et al.’s, 2006 work
on agreement) that ‘agreement for first- and second-person can
never take place under mere Agree,’ but requires the Spec–Head
relation. I believe this is on the right track. In “The Place of
Person in the Structure of the Noun Phrase and on the Clausal
Spine,” I will present an analysis of the place of person in the
structure of the complex noun phrase and on the clausal spine
which is mobilized in “The Syntax of Agreement: Agree Versus
the Spec–Head Relation,” “Person Agreement as Attraction,”
“Agreement Attraction “Long-Distance Agreement,” “Long-
Distance Agreement,” “Copular Inversion and Agreement,” and
“Relativization and Agreement” to explain how person agreement
is different from number agreement, and to derive the main
effects of SCOPA.
(18) Structural Condition on Person Agreement (SCOPA)
a category F can bear the features +1 or +2 if and only
if a projection of F merges with a phrase that has that
feature and F is taken as the label of the resulting phrase.
The Place of Person in the Structure of
the Noun Phrase and on the Clausal
Spine
For the functional heads for person (Harley and Ritter’s, 2002
class node PARTICIPANT) and number (Harley and Ritter’s
INDIVIDUATION), I will henceforth use the Greek letter pi and
the symbol #, resp. Like Harley and Ritter, I will take pi to
exclusively make the distinction between speaker ([+AUTHOR])
and addressee ([–AUTHOR]). For ‘third person.’ the feature [–
PARTICIPANT] can be assigned to the D-head of the nominal
phrase. But importantly, ‘third person’ is not a possible
specification for pi.7 The following subsections address the place
of pi and # in the complex noun phrase (see “The Place of Person
in the Internal Structure of the Noun Phrase”) and on the clausal
spine (see “The Place of Person on the Clausal Spine”).
7Absence of any specification for person is often a viable option for ‘third person’
(Benveniste, 1966; Harley and Ritter, 2002; Nevins, 2007; Harbour, 2016; Ackema
and Neeleman, 2018); but for English, third person is arguably D[−PART]. Relevant
here is the discussion (in the section entitled “The Featural Specification of Who
as Relative Operator”) of the English relative operator who as radically unspecified
for person.
The Place of Person in the Internal Structure of the
Noun Phrase
As a starting point, I will build up the structure of the complex
noun phrase, along the lines of (19), which is effectively a ‘syntactic
translation’ of Harley and Ritter’s (2002) feature geometry for
the set of ϕ-features — person, number, and gender.8
(19) the structure of the noun phrase
(a) [NP N{IND,CLASS}]
(b) [#P #{IND,CLASS} [NP N{IND,CLASS}]]
(c) [#P piP [#{IND,CLASS} [NP N{IND,CLASS}]]]
(d) [DP D{IND,CLASS} [#P piP [#{IND,CLASS}
[NP N{IND, CLASS}]]]]
DP
  D #P
P    #’
  #  NP
At the bottom of the noun phrase, we find a projection of the
head noun, N. The gender specification of the noun (CLASS, again
following Harley and Ritter’s, 2002 terminology) is inherent to N.
The noun is also specified for number, but its number properties
are environmental, not genetic: the value for the feature [IND] is
determined by a functional head labeled #, projecting outside NP.
On top of #P, a projection for the definite determiner (D) can be
built. This D-head establishes an Agree relation with # for [IND]
and [CLASS], which is how articles get specified for number and
gender. Importantly, person is represented inside the structure
of the noun phrase not as a head on the nominal spine but as
a specifier in the nominal extended projection — the specifier of
#P, to be precise. It occupies the same structural position (mutatis
mutandis) as the subject of a clause: with D corresponding to C,
and # corresponding to I, the piP in (19d) occupies the equivalent
of SpecIP in the clause.
One thing that the proposal in (19) helps explain is the well-
known fact (see Postal, 1966) that (20a,b) are grammatical while
(20c) is not (regardless of the case form of the pronoun):
(20)(a) we/us linguists
[#P piP = we/us [#{IND:PL,CLASS} [NP N{IND:PL,CLASS} = linguists]]]
(b) you linguists
[#P piP = you [#{IND:PL,CLASS} [NP N{IND:PL,CLASS} = linguists]]]
(c) ∗they/them linguists
The pronouns in (20a,b) are interpreted as the subjects of
the predicate linguists, with # as the RELATOR of the predication
relation (in the sense of Den Dikken, 2006). To be able to form
8For my purposes here, it is immaterial whether N is inherently endowed with
a categorial feature or has its category label determined by a n-head merged
outside NP. In the latter case, it will be n, not N, that is endowed with the
gender feature. I have very little to say in this paper about gender agreement
(attraction). If gender agreement involves feature valuation in syntax, it should
behave very much like number agreement: both IND and CLASS are present on
D. But I am not convinced that there is a gender probe on the clausal spine. I will
proceed on the assumption that gender agreement involves concord (on which
see “Relativization and Agreement”). For experiments and discussion (incl. a
literature review) of gender agreement attraction effects (with some surprising
results from Russian), I refer the reader to Slioussar and Malko (2016).
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a grammatical pronoun–noun construction of this sort, # must
be present in the structure and explicitly specified for number
to serve as a RELATOR. In simple binary number systems such
as English, ‘singular’ is absence of an explicit specification for
number (i.e., a ‘bare’ class node [IND]). This explains the fact
that (20a,b) do not have singular counterparts (∗I linguist, ∗you
linguist). And to be eligible for occupying Spec#P in (19), the
pronoun must be specified for person, and no larger than piP.9
The English third person plural pronouns they and them fail to
meet these requirements. I have taken the position that ‘third
person’ never instantiates a feature specification for the person
head pi (which is only specifiable for [± AUTHOR]), but instead
is marked on D as [–PART] (or not marked at all; see fn. 7). The
fact that the English third person plural pronouns they and them
are introduced by the same voiced dental fricative that represents
the definite article (the) confirms that these pronouns project full-
fledged DPs, too large for Spec#P. This explains why in English,
they and them cannot be combined with the projection of a
common noun, as in (20c).10
Cross-linguistically as well, first- and second-person pronouns
show a tendency to be relatively small in size, whereas third-
person pronouns pattern with DPs.11 Thus, in the Romance
languages, while the third-person object clitic pronouns typically
feature a token of the definite article (D = l-) in their morphology
(cf. French le ‘him,’ la ‘her,’ les ‘them’), the first- and second-
person clitics do not. And in Hungarian (21), where full DPs
and third-person pronouns serving as objects invariably trigger
definiteness inflection on the transitive verb, first- and second-
person object pronouns combine with indefinite inflection, due
to their limited size (no larger than #P).
(21)(a) szereted a fiút / o˝t (Hungarian)
love.2SG.DEF the boy.ACC (s)he.ACC







9On why a DP cannot serve as the specifier of the constituent occupying the
complement position of a higher D, see Den Dikken and Dékány (2018).
10From Postal (1966), I retain the idea that the pronoun in we/us/you linguists
occupies D — not through base-insertion (as Postal had it) but via raising. For
a related proposal regarding the syntax of ‘pluringulars’ (as in the committee
are deliberating), see Den Dikken (2001). See also Spanish ‘unagreement,’ briefly
discussed in fn. 28, below.
11A reviewer mentions that in Cheke Holo (an Oceanic language spoken on
the Solomon Islands; see Bosma, 1981; Palmer, 2009), first- and second-person
pronouns can co-occur with determiners (see, e.g., ta-hati-a ‘weINCL-PL-ART’).
A cursory inspection of the data suggests to me that this happens only when they
are emphasized (with the emphasis particle egu, even in vocatives) or focused (with
the particle si, as in si iago ia ‘FOC youSG ART’), although appearing with si does
not seem to require the presence of the article (si go-tilo ‘FOC you-PL’). Whatever
the determinants of the presence of the article with first-/second-person pronouns
in Cheke Holo may turn out to be, it is noteworthy that articled personal pronouns
do not seem to trigger person agreement on the finite verb in this language. This
may follow from the proposal presented in this paper: when #P is encapsulated in
a DP, the piP in Spec#P becomes very difficult (perhaps impossible) to access as an
Agree-goal for the clausal pi-head.
In the structure of nominal expressions, person/[PART] finds
itself in the specifier position of number/[IND]. Inside the noun
phrase, there is agreement for number and gender, but never for
[PART]. Similarly, # (spelled out by the indefinite article, simple
numerals, perhaps certain existential quantifiers) inflects for
number and gender, but never for [PART]. That D, # and N share
their specifications for number and gender is a straightforward
reflex of the fact that all three are in an Agree-chain (‘head-head
agreement’; cf. also ‘feature inheritance’ or ‘extended projection’),
all having matching number and gender properties. The piP, as a
left branch, is not a member of this chain.
The Place of Person on the Clausal Spine
On the clausal spine, # andpi are also separate entities. But this time
around, they find themselves in a complementation configuration,
with the #-head embedding piP as its complement:12
(22) [CP C [#P #{IND} [piP pi{PART} (...) [VP V{IND,PART}]]]]
In the clause, the finite verb shows agreement with the subject
for number and person. The fact that person is a player in
the clausal agreement system (unlike inside the noun phrase)
indicates that it must be able to serve as a probe, adorned
with unvalued feature [uPART]. This motivates the decision to
representpi as a head on the clausal spine. Number has that status
as well, bearing [uIND]. In addition, the head # is responsible for
the assignment of nominative case to the subject. Nominative
case is associated with ϕ rather than tense (as we know from
inflected infinitives with nominative subjects in Portuguese;
Raposo, 1987). For reasons discussed in the section entitled “The
Syntax of Agreement: Agree Versus the Spec–Head Relation,”
the clausal pi-head cannot serve as a probe in (downward)
Agree relations, so in constructions in which the nominative
subject appears below the inflectional domain (sentences with
‘VP-internal subjects’) it is inevitable to pin the nominative case
feature on #. In constructions in which the nominative subject
appears in the structural subject position (‘SpecIP’), it surfaces
in the higher of the two ϕ-related functional projections in (22):
the contrast between probably he isn’t the culprit and ∗probably
isn’t he the culprit shows that, with is in the higher inflectional
head, the nominative subject he must be placed to its left, in
Spec#P. This in turn tells us that # is structurally higher than pi
(something that, for Indo-European, is impossible to verify on
morphological grounds: person and number form portmanteaux
in the verbal inflectional system of IE). The #-over-pi structure in
(22) is further supported on the basis of the syntax of number and
person agreement in these languages, as I will now show.
The Syntax of Agreement: Agree Versus
the Spec–Head Relation
The hypothesis that person is represented as a specifier in the
noun phrase and as a functional head on the clausal spine
12See esp. Preminger (2011) for a defence of this structure, aimed, like the
present paper, at an understanding of SCOPA and the restrictions on person
agreement. Hartmann & Heycock (under review) likewise have number and
person project autonomously, but they follow Sigurðsson and Holmberg’s (2008)
lead in placing person above number.
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below number has important consequences for the distribution
of person agreement in the clause.
In the structure of the noun phrase, person is not represented
on D or #.13 So how does person agreement in the clause come
about? Let us first examine (downward) Agree. The person
head on the clausal spine has nothing to probe for: the piP
of the pronominal subject in the verbal core is not directly
accessible to the clausal pi-head because it is contained within
the pronominal subject, occupying the specifier position of the
subject, which is itself a specifier. Subparts of specifiers are not
directly accessible to higher probes: specifiers are merged into
the structure as fully built structural chunks (see Uriagereka,
1999 for the origins of this idea); no outside probe can by itself
reach into the innards of a specifier. So the clausal pi-head cannot
directly target the piP inside the subject. The clausal pi-head
cannot target the entire subject pronoun (i.e., #P) integrally either
because #P, specified for [IND] but not for [PART], is not a
match for the pi-head’s [uPART] feature. So person agreement
cannot happen under (downward) Agree.14 And since the clausal
pi-head cannot probe the pronominal subject of the clause, it
cannot attract it to its specifier position either, so it also cannot
establish a Spec–Head relation with the pronominal subject in
the clausal piP.
But the next higher head, #, does manage to Agree with and
attract the pronominal #P, provided that the clausal pi-head with
its [uPART] feature gets out of the way. Locality of probing
makes it impossible for the #-head’s [uIND] feature to probe past
an intervening unvalued feature [uPART] on the clausal spine.15
But if the clausal pi-head raises and adjoins to #, then # will
find a match without obstruction: it can engage in an Agree
relation with the pronominal #P; and if the EPP so dictates,
the clausal #-head can also attract the pronominal #P to its
specifier, which results in a Spec–Head relation between the
clausal #-head and the pronominal subject. This Spec–Head
relation involves not just number but person as well. The clausal
pi-head must raise to # in order for # to be able to attract the
pronominal subject to Spec#P, adjoining to # and forming a
complex probe [# pi [#]] with it. Under the Spec–Head relation
between this complex probe and the subject, a total match
between the two must be forged, in concert with (23) (from
Den Dikken and Dékány, 2019; see also Guasti and Rizzi, 2002;
Shlonsky, 2004, p. 1496; Franck et al., 2006 for relevant facts
and discussion):
13Here and in what follows, whenever I talk about ‘person,’ I am referring to first-
or second-person. Recall that ‘third person,’ whenever it involves an explicit feature
specification [–PART], is marked on D, not on pi; ‘third person pronouns’ are DPs,
behaving in relevant respects like common noun phrases.
14Preminger (2009; 2011, p. 920) discusses examples of long-distance agreement
from ‘substandard Basque’ which he takes to instantiate person-feature valuation
under downward Agree. I do not have the space here to engage in a discussion of
these examples. I would seek to reanalyse them in terms of object shift into the
matrix clause, with person valuation under the Spec–Head relation.
15If the intervening feature had been valued antecedently, # would have had no
trouble probing past it. But since (for reasons discussed in the previous paragraph)
pi cannot probe and value its unvalued feature by itself, this causes this feature to
be a harmful intervener for the establishment of probe–goal relations by functional
heads higher on the clausal spine. Taking pi out of the way (by raising it up to #) is
the only way around this intervention effect.
(23) the TOTAL MATCH constraint on Spec–Head agreement
feature checking under the Spec–Head relationship
requires total matching of the features of the head and
the features of its specifier.
Under (downward) Agree, the functional head # probes the
subject just for its own unvalued [uIND] feature. But once the #-
head has probed the subject and attracted it to the specifier of
the complex probe [# pi [#]], a total match must be established
between this probe and the subject, by (23). The probe–goal
relation between the clausal #-head and #P lifts the opacity
of the latter, rendering the piP in the specifier position of the
pronominal subject an accessible goal to the pi-portion of the
complex probe.16 The structure in (24) illustrates, for first- and
second-person pronominal subjects.
(24) [#P [#P piP{PART: ± AUTHOR} [#′ #{IND} [NP N]]]i
[#′ [# pi{uPART} [#{uIND}]]... tpi... ti...]]
The result of (24) is agreement for both number and person,
with the latter contingent on the former, as desired: it is
impossible for the finite verb of a clause to agree with a pronoun
in person but not in number, but the converse IS possible. Directly
relevant to the unidirectional contingency relation between
person and number agreement are the facts in (25) (Akmajian,
1970, p. 154), involving highest-subject relativization, and (26)
(Baker, 2011, p. 887), illustrating Kimball and Aissen (1971)-type
relatives in which the head (a non-subject within the relative
clause) attempts to control agreement with the finite verb of the
relative clause.
(25)(a) I, who am tall, was forced to squeeze into that VW
(b) we, who are/∗am tall, were forced to squeeze into that
VW
(26)(a) ∗I, who Clark am hoping will come,..
(b) !we, who Clark are hoping will come,..
The ungrammaticality of (25b) with am tells us that person
agreement in the absence of number agreement is illegal. And
the fact that are is possible (for speakers who have ‘Kimball
and Aissen effects’) in (26b) indicates that the verb can agree
with the head in number without agreeing in person: after all,
from the ungrammaticality of (26a) [recall (15a)] we learn that
person agreement between the finite verb of the relative clause
and the head of the relative is impossible when the head is not the
finite verb’s subject.
To summarize, there can be no person agreement under
downward Agree between the clausal pi-head and the piP of the
subject pronoun because, the latter being encapsulated inside an
opaque #P, pi cannot itself peek inside the subject and target its
specifier (piP). But, provided that pi raises to #, the clausal #-
head can probe the entire subject pronoun, #P, and attract it
to its specifier. Once #P has been probed, its specifier becomes
accessible, and hence, in compliance with the constraint in (23),
which demands that all the features of the complex probe [# pi
[#]] find a match, the pi-portion of this complex probe values the
16For a defense of the idea that probe–goal relations open up otherwise opaque
domains, see Den Dikken (2018).
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[uPART] feature of the subject’s piP-specifier. The raised pi-head
MUST probe the subject when the latter is in Spec#P. By contrast,
when the subject does not raise, pi CANNOT probe it when pi is
in situ (because #P is not a match for it, and the subject’s piP
is not accessible); and when pi moves and adjoins to #, it lies
dormant as an inactive subpart of [# pi [#]] unless it is activated
by the constraint in (23), which applies only when [# pi [#]] is in a
Spec–Head relation with the raised subject. From this it emerges
that person agreement with pronominal subjects is possible if and
only if the subject is in a Spec–Head relationship established in
the #P on the clausal spine. Person agreement under (downward)
Agree is impossible.
Person Agreement as Attraction
In the approach taken in the section entitled “The Syntax
of Agreement: Agree Versus the Spec–Head Relation,” person
agreement between the finite verb and a first- or second-person
pronominal subject involves a relationship of feature valuation
targeting the specifier of the structural subject, itself occupying
a specifier position [see (24), repeated below]. This reminds
us of agreement attraction cases of the type in (27b) [recall
(14b), above]. Like (24), (27b) instantiates an agreement relation
between the finite verb and the specifier (here, the possessor) of
the structural subject: see (28).
(27)(a) these people’s identity is to remain a secret
(b) !these people’s identity are to remain a secret
(28) [#P [DP1 DP2{−PART,IND:PL} [D′ D{−PART,IND}... [NP N]]]i
[#′ [# pi{uPART} [#{uIND}]]... tpi... ti...]]
(24) [#P [#P piP{PART:±AUTHOR} [#′ #{IND} [NP N]]]i
[#′ [# pi{uPART} [#{uIND}]]... tpi... ti...]]
In (24), the clausal pi-head gets a chance to agree with
the piP embedded in the pronominal subject thanks to the
fact that the #-head of the clause values its [uIND] feature
against that of the #P in its specifier. Similarly, in (28) the
#-head gets a chance to value its [uIND] feature against
the [IND:PL] specification of the possessor DP2 embedded in
the possessive DP2 thanks to the fact that the pi-portion of
the complex probe [# pi [#]] can establish a feature-valuing
relationship with the [–PART] feature on the head of the
possessive DP1, opening it up for # probing the plural feature of
DP2. With (27b) commonly referred to as a case of agreement
attraction, we come to the conclusion that person agreement
with first- or second-person subject pronouns is a form of
agreement attraction.
This is a prima facie rather surprising conclusion in light of
the fact that whereas (27b) is usually considered an error, person
agreement with the subject is perfectly flawless. Why does person
agreement not have the acceptability status of familiar agreement
attraction cases? The answer lies in competition. In the case of
person agreement (24), there is just a single [PART]-specified
node in the Spec–Head domain of the complex probe [# pi [#]],
meeting no competition and serving as the only possible match
for the probe’s [uPART] feature. In (28), on the other hand, there
are two instances of [IND] present in the complex subject: one
on DP1 and another on DP2. Each is a potential match for an
agreement relation with the finite verb. When such competition
presents itself, the structurally closest agreement relation is the
unmarked one. In (27a), the clausal #-head agrees directly with
DP1 in the structure in (28); in (27b), valuation of [uIND] is
postponed until after pi-probing has opened up DP1 and made
DP2 available as a goal for #. The unmarked option of these two
is (27a); (27b) is the marked case. But in the case of (24), there
is no competition — indeed, probing the piP in Spec#P is the
clausal pi-head’s only chance (its last resort, if you will) at getting
its [uPART] feature valued. Hence markedness does not come into
play in (24).
Agreement Attraction
The bulk of the literature on number agreement attraction effects
has concentrated, not on cases in which the attractor occupies
the ‘Saxon genitive’ position [as in (14b)], but instead on cases
in which the attractor is contained in a post-nominal PP or
relative clause, as in (14a) [adapted from Kayne, 2000, and
repeated here as (29a)], (29b,c) (Bock and Miller, 1991) and (29d)
(Dillon et al., 2013).
(29)(a) the identity of these people {is/!are} to remain a secret
(b) the key to the cabinets {is/!are} rusty
(c) the path to the monuments {is/!are} littered with bottles
(d) the new executive who oversaw the middle managers
{was/!were} dishonest about the company’s profits.
In Den Dikken (2001), I suggested (following Kayne, 1998)
that the DP-contained plural makes its way up to SpecDP (the
‘Saxon genitive’ position) at LF, via an operation akin to or
identical with Quantifier Raising. This would help account for
the distributive interpretation of (29a) (for each person, there is
a different identity) and possibly of (29b) as well. But a QR-style
approach does not carry over to (29c,d), for which there is neither
a Saxon-genitival paraphrase nor a distributive reading — and
at any rate, QR out of a relative clause would be syntactically
very difficult to uphold. I will not pursue this line of thinking
further, therefore.
For (29a–c), the idea that probe–goal relations make otherwise
opaque domains transparent (Den Dikken, 2018; recall fn. 16)
may be put to good syntactic use, with the clause-level pi-probe
agreeing with the subject-DP for [–PART] and allowing the
#-probe to target the DP-contained plural noun phrase. But
for (29d), it is inconceivable that the matrix #-head could be
given syntactic access to the plural object of the relative clause
construed with executive. For examples of this type, it seems
to me vanishingly likely that syntax could assist in providing
an account. So although syntax can make major strides in the
understanding of agreement attraction, there remains to my mind
an irreducible residue of linear string effects in the realm of
agreement attraction phenomena. (Relevant here as well is the
discussion of Dillon et al., 2017 at the end of section “Feature
Sharing in Non-subject Relativization: The Kimball and Aissen
Facts Revisited,” below.)
But neither structurally nor linearly is the person specification
of a subpart of the complex subject ever local to the finite verb.
As a consequence, agreement attraction never involves person,
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as we saw in (16) (repeated below): the piP embedded inside the
specifier of the clausal #-head cannot be engaged in an agreement
relation with the #-adjoined pi-head of the clause.
(16)(a) the identity of me {is/∗am} to remain a secret
my identity {is/∗am} to remain a secret
(b) the identity of you {is/∗are} to remain a secret
your identity {is/∗are} to remain a secret
In (30), I illustrate the structure of the second example in
(16a). The clausal #-head’s [uIND] can find a match in the number
specification for DP1, the possessive noun phrase. And pi can
value its [uPART] feature against DP1’s [–PART], contributed by
the D-head. The result of these feature valuations is my identity
is to remain a secret, which is grammatical. As pi finds a match
in [–PART] (‘third person’) on DP1, it cannot probe beyond this
point. Hence, the possessor’s pi[PART:+AUTH] never comes into the
picture. Even though both (30) and (24) (the latter repeated once
more below, for ease of direct comparison) feature a piP in the
specifier domain of the clausal [# pi [# #]] probe, only in (24) is
this piP accessible to the pi-portion of the complex probe: in (24),
the specifier of the clausal #-head is not itself specified for [PART],
enablingpi to pick the person specification of the subject pronoun
as its goal; but in (30), DP1 bears [–PART], rendering a valuation
relationship between the clausal pi-head and the person features
of DP1’s pronominal possessor impossible.
(30) [#P [DP1 [#P piP{PART:+AUTH} [#′ #{IND}...]
[D′ D1{−PART,IND}...]] [#′ [# pi{uPART} [#{uIND}]]...]]
(24) [#P [#P piP{PART:±AUTHOR} [#′ #{IND} [NP N]]]
[#′ [# pi{uPART} [#{uIND}]]...]]
For the versions of (16) in which the personal pronoun
occurs in a post-nominal of -phrase, agreement between the finite
verb and the person feature of the pronoun is also impossible.
Syntactically, the fact that the container-DP is specified as [–
PART] once again renders a probe–goal relation between the
clausal pi-head and the pronoun’s piP impossible. And because
the pronoun’s piP is the specifier of the pronominal #P, it is not
linearly adjacent to the finite verb either. All avenues toward
person agreement attraction in constructions of the type in (16)
are thus blocked, as desired.
Long-Distance Agreement
Now that we have an answer to the question of why person-
agreement attraction fails in (16), let us verify that long-distance
person agreement of the type in (17b) [repeated below, along with
grammatical (17a)] is also correctly ruled out.
(17)(a) [e¸-sau ke.-de. i] e-tum e¸-tawa (Loka¸a¸)
7-fish GER/5-buy 7SG-be.very 7SG-be.difficult
‘buying fish is very difficult’
(b) ∗[min ke-funna] n-tum n-tawa
1SG GER/5-surprise 1SG-be.very 1SG-be.difficult
‘surprising me is very difficult’
The number feature of ê-sau ‘fish’ in (17a) is directly
represented on DP, and accessible to the complex [# pi [# #]]
probe in the matrix clause after the pi-portion of this probe has
established a feature valuation relation with CP, which I assume
is, like D, specified for [–PART].17 But the person feature of min
in (17b) is not a possible goal for the matrix pi-probe: after pi has
valued its [uPART] feature against CP’s [–PART], it is no longer
active as a probe. The structures in (31a) and (31b) (in which I
treat the gerund as the structural of the matrix clause18) illustrate,
for (17a) and (17b), respectively.
(31)(a) [#P [CP [DP D{−PART,IND}...]
[C′ C{−PART}...]] [#′ [# pi{uPART} [#{uIND}]]...]]
(b) [#P [CP [#P piP{PART: ± AUTHOR} [#′ #{IND} [NP N]]]
[C′ C{−PART}...]] [#′ [# pi{uPART} [#{uIND}]]...]]
Copular Inversion and Agreement
Next, let us take a closer look at the specificational copular
sentences of the section entitled “Agreement in Specificational
Copular Sentences.” In these sentences, person agreement
with the post-copular subject of predication is impossible.
The examples in (32) and (33) (repeated from above)
show this clearly.
(32)(a) all I could see {was/were} two staring eyes
(b) all I could see {was/∗were} you
(33)(a) ∗ze betwijfelen dat de schuldige ik ben (Dutch)
they doubt that the culprit I am
(b) ∗ze betwijfelen dat de schuldige jij bent
they doubt that the culprit you are
(c) ze betwijfelen dat de schuldige Jan is
they doubt that the culprit Jan is
This again falls out from the proposal in “The Syntax
of Agreement: Agree Versus the Spec–Head Relation,” given
the analysis of inverse specificational copular sentences first
presented in Moro (1997) and developed in further detail in Den
Dikken (2006), according to which their syntax involves fronting
of the underlying predicate into the structural subject position, as
illustrated in (34):
(34)(a) [SC=RP [SUBJECT] [R′ RELATOR [PREDICATE]]]
⇒ PREDICATE INVERSION⇒
(b) [TP [PREDICATE]i [T′ T+RELATOR = be
[SC=RP [SUBJECT] [R′ tREL ti]]]]
Predicate inversion results in a syntactic structure in which
the only way in which the copula can establish an agreement
17For Indo-European, it is not difficult to argue that finite C is specified for person
in the same way that D is: the finite complementisers of Indo-European derive
from nominal elements (demonstratives, wh-words). In the Loka¸a¸ examples in
(17), there is no C-element to which we can attribute properties on independent
grounds. But the fact that we are dealing with a gerund (well-known to be a
hybrid of nominal and clausal properties) makes it plausible to assume that its C is
specified for ‘third person.’
I will ignore the gender (noun-class) agreement found in (17). See fn. 8 for some
remarks on gender agreement.
18The familiar long-distance number/gender agreement cases of Tsez [from
Polinsky and Potsdam, 2001; see (i)] involve a clause in complement (rather than
subject) position. See Den Dikken (2018) for discussion of how this long-distance
agreement comes about.
(i) eni-r [už-a¯ magalu b-a¯c’-ru-łi] b-iyxo
mother-DAT boy-ERG bread.III.ABS III-eat-PTC-NOMINAL.IV III-knows
‘the mother knows that they boy ate the bread’
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relationship with the post-copular subject is via (downward)
Agree. Agree with the entire post-copular subject, as in (32a) and
(33c), is perfectly fine; but person agreement with a subpart of the
post-copular subject (in particular, with its piP) is impossible, for
reasons discussed in “The Syntax of Agreement: Agree Versus the
Spec–Head Relation.”
It also follows from the approach to syntactic agreement
taken in this paper that in contexts of the type in (35b) and
(36b), agreement attraction is impossible even for number. In
the a-sentences, the noun phrase of people is the specifier of the
specifier of the clausal #-head, just as in (27b), whose structure
was given in (28). But in (35b) and (36b), the noun phrase of
people is not in an agreement relation with #. This plural noun
phrase is invisible to # both under the Spec–Head relation and
for Agree purposes: though it is in the c-command domain
of the probe #, the #-head can Agree directly only with the
complex singular possessive noun phrase as a whole, which leads
unequivocally to singular verb inflection.
(35)(a) two people’s silhouette {was/!were} all I could decipher
(b) all I could decipher {was/∗were} two people’s silhouette
(36)(a) these people’s information {is/!are} the cause of the
computer glitch
(b) the cause of the computer glitch {is/∗are} these
people’s information
The prediction made by the proposal accords well with the
facts: while are is possible in the a-examples under attraction,
it does not work at all in the copular inversion constructions in
(35b) and (36b).19
Relativization and Agreement
Finally, I will now return to the Kimball and Aissen (1971)
facts, further enhanced by Baker (2011). The key contrast here is
between (37a,b) and (37c) [adapted from (13) and (15), above]:20
(37)(a) I, who Clark {is/∗am} hoping will be the finalist,..
(b) you, who Clark {is/∗are} hoping will be the finalist,..
(c) these people, who Clark {is/!are} hoping will be
the finalists,..
While the finite verb in the relative clause can be attracted to
the number specification of the head of the relative clause, its
person feature cannot be matched by the finite verb when the
head is not its subject.
This observation is significant because, as we saw already in
(25) [repeated below as (38)], when the head IS the subject of the
19The there-existential in (ib) makes the same point, given a predicate inversion
approach to there-sentences (Hoekstra and Mulder, 1990). (ia) with are is identical
with a naturally occurring sentence taken from the internet; but in (ib) are is
entirely impossible.
(i) (a) some people’s information {is/!are} stored in a database
(b) there {is/∗are} some people’s information stored in a database
20For the sake of uniformity, (37) gives a triple of non-restrictive relatives. Kimball
and Aissen’s (1971) original examples involve restrictive relatives; but with first-
and second-person heads, only non-restrictives are possible. As Baker (2011,
p. 887, fn. 10) points out, number attraction to plural is possible in non-restrictive
relatives as well.
relative clause, person agreement between the head and the finite
verb of the relative clause is grammatical:
(38)(a) I, who am tall, was forced to squeeze into that VW
(b) we, who are/∗am tall, were forced to
squeeze into that VW
But even when the head is itself a subject, its person agreement
behavior has an interesting twist: as Morgan (1972, p. 284) points
out, long-distance relativization makes person agreement with
the verb in the downstairs clause impossible:
(39) ∗I, who John says (the FBI thinks) am an
anarchist/responsible,. . .
The empirical picture for person agreement under
relativization is further complicated when we take the case
form of the head of the relative clause (determined in the external
syntactic context) into account. Kimball and Aissen (1971,
p. 241) note that number agreement between the non-subject
head and the finite verb is possible even when the head is not in a
nominative case environment in the matrix clause:
(40) Mark knows/wants to talk to the people who Clark
{thinks/!think} are in the garden
For number agreement between the head and the finite clause
in cases of highest-subject relativization, the case-form of the
head is also inconsequential, as (41) shows. However, Akmajian
(1970) notes that person agreement in this context is possible only
if the head is itself nominative: see (42).
(41) he had the nerve to say that to them, who have made
him what he is today
(42) ∗he had the nerve to say that to me, who have made him
what he is today
What I would like to present in this section is a comprehensive
account of this entire picture. To my knowledge, this has never
been undertaken previously. Analyses of the facts in (38) and
(39) are themselves quite few and far between (since Akmajian,
1970; Ross, 1970; Morgan, 1972 first unearthed them, the
generative literature has largely set them aside, with a moderate
resurgence of attention in recent works by Heck and Cuartero,
2012; Douglas, 2015). But as far as I am aware, these subject
relativization data have never been coupled with an analysis of
the (extended) Kimball and Aissen facts.21
The following are the key players in the discussion to follow:
(a) the representation of person and number in the complex
noun phrase presented in “The Syntax of Agreement: Agree
Versus the Spec–Head Relation”
(b) the properties of the relative operator who
(c) an analysis of relativization involving predication inside
the noun phrase (Den Dikken, 2006)
(d) feature sharing between the relative CP and the head noun
phrase under concord
21Douglas (2015, p. 46, fn. 6) does in fact mention one the Kimball and Aissen facts
in passing, but never draws these data into the analysis.
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(e) feature sharing between CP, its head C, and the inflectional
system of the clausal spine
With these players, we can gain a complete understanding of the
facts in (37)–(42). The account is entirely deterministic, based
in its entirety on assumptions defended in the foregoing and
standard or independently plausible ingredients of the theory.
The Featural Specification of Who as Relative
Operator
Let me begin by stating and supporting my assumptions
regarding the featural specification of the relative operator who
(which converge with those in Douglas, 2015, contra Heck and
Cuartero, 2012).
The operator who projects a DP. As we know from the section
entitled “The Place of Person in the Structure of the Noun
Phrase and on the Clausal Spine,” D is not specifiable for the
features [PART:± AUTHOR] (i.e., for first- or second-person): piP
finds itself on a left-branch position inside the structure of the
complex noun phrase, and its specification for [PART] does not
‘percolate’ up to D. We expect it to be universally impossible for
wh-operators to be inherently marked for [PART: ± AUTHOR]. I
assume that inherently, the D-head of who is radically unspecified
for [PART].
But D IS specifiable for the feature [IND]. In English wh-
questions, who is systematically singular (who is/∗are coming?,
who is/∗are eligible?) unless it is in a predication relation with a
plural-marked nominal, as in who are the finalists? (a question
enquiring about the identity of the individuals to which the
finalists applies, NOT a question asking the interlocutor to
name the property that the finalists share — the latter would
require the use of what as the wh-operator). In light of the fact
that who, even in English wh-questions, can be plural-marked
under the appropriate circumstances, I assume that the wh-word
who is capable of bearing the feature specification [IND:PL]. (I
return in the section entitled “Feature Sharing in Non-subject
Relativization: The Kimball and Aissen Facts Revisited” to the
way in which this comes about.) In relative clauses with a plural-
marked human head, it is this plural-specified who that serves as
the relative operator.
The Syntax of Relativized Noun Phrases
My outlook on the syntactic structure of relativized noun phrases
is anchored in Den Dikken’s (2006) general theory of the syntax of
predication. In this theory, relations that are traditionally treated
in terms of modification and its structural correlate of adjunction
are brought into the predicational fold, with adjectival attributive
modification constructions of the type in (43a) involving reverse
predication (i.e., a structure in which the predicate finds itself
in the specifier position of the RELATOR phrase), and their
counterparts in (43b) being instances of canonical predication
(with the predicate in the complement of the RELATOR head).
(43)(a) the visible stars [RP [AP A] [R′ RELATOR [#P # [NP N]]]]
the responsible person
(b) the stars visible [RP [#P # [NP N]] [R′ RELATOR [AP A]]]
the person responsible
For relative clause constructions, this procures a
straightforward analysis, with the relative clause in the position
of AP in (43b), as shown in (44).
(44) the stars that are visible
[RP [#P # [NP N]] [R′ RELATOR [CP RELCLAUSE]]]
the person who is responsible
The difference between restrictive and non-restrictive
relativization can be made in familiar terms, as a function of the
size of the relativized constituent (i.e., the nominal in SpecRP).
I will not take a specific stand on this issue. I will say only that
the familiar ban on restrictive relativization of first- and second-
person pronouns can be made to follow if restrictive relatives are
necessarily in the scope of the D-head whereas non-restrictives
are not: recall from “The Place of Person in the Internal Structure
of the Noun Phrase” that first- and second-person pronouns are
mere #Ps, hence ineligible for restrictive relativization except
when a D is merged with them, as in the me you’re seeing now is
different from the me people see in public (see also fn. 22).
The Raising Approach to Relativization Cannot Make
the Right Cut
From (44) it is apparent that I am adopting a head-external
approach to relative clauses: the head does not originate inside
the relative clause. The person facts reviewed in the introduction
to this section supply us with a cogent argument against existing
head-internal or ‘raising’ analyses of relativization, at least for
non-restrictive relatives with a first-person pronominal head.
Both Kayne’s (1994) version of the raising approach and
Bianchi’s (1999) development thereof treat the head of the relative
clause and the relative operator (who or which, depending on
the humanness of the head) as a single constituent. At some
point before the end of the syntactic derivation, the head moves
around the relative operator into SpecDP, which is its terminus
for Kayne; Bianchi subsequently splits the head and the relative
operator apart via onward movement of the head into a position
in the high left periphery of the relative clause. But such onward
movement happens well and truly after the DP in (45) has already
vacated its A-position in the clausal core — the structural subject
position in the cases under consideration here. So the difference
between Kayne’s and Bianchi’s versions of the raising analysis is of
no consequence to us here: the two analyses share (45a) and (45b).
(45)(a) [DP [D′ D = who/which HEAD]]
(b) [DP HEADi [D′ D = who/which ti]]
Let us investigate what the predictions made by (45) are for
person agreement with the head.
To make the examination easier, (46) presents an update of
(45) for the specific case of a first-person relativized head:
(46)(a) [DP [D′ D = who [#P piP[PART:+AUTHOR] [#′ #...]]]]
(b) [DP [#P piP[PART:+AUTHOR] [#′ #...]]i [D′ D = who ti]]
An immediate question we face is whether the movement of
the head to SpecDP happens before or after the DP has made
its way into the Â-domain of the relative clause. There is no
immediately obvious answer to this question; so I will do the
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exercise of verifying the possibility of person agreement with the
head for both logically possible scenarios. If the head remains
in situ in the complement position of D while the DP is still in
the A-domain of the clause, we get (47a); if movement to SpecDP
happens early, we get (47b).
(47)(a) [#P [DP [D′ D = who [#P piP [#′ #...]]]] [#′ [# pi [# #]]..
(b) [#P [DP [#P piP [#′ #...]]i [D′ D = who ti]] [#′ [# pi [# #]]..
Person agreement between the complex probe [# pi [# #]] and
the pronoun contained inside the subject-DP will be possible in
(47a) and (47b) provided that the piP of the pronoun, which is
quite deeply embedded in the subject, can be made accessible to
thepi-portion of the complex probe. We can give thepi-part of the
probe access to piP inside the subject only if the complex probe
establishes a feature-valuation relationship with DP and #P. The
#-portion of the [# pi [# #]] probe can value its [uIND] feature
against that of DP, and D and # share their [IND] specification
within the extended nominal projection (‘feature inheritance’ or
‘head-head agreement’). By the logic of Den Dikken’s (2018)
theory of locality, this should probably be sufficient to render
both DP and #P transparent for the purposes of a probe–goal
relationship between the clausal pi-probe and the piP inside DP. I
have assumed (see “The Featural Specification of Who as Relative
Operator”) that the D-head of who is itself radically unspecified
for [PART]. So provided that the #-portion of the clausal [# pi [#
#]] probe matches its [uIND] feature against that of D, it should
be technically possible for the pi-portion of this probe to match
the [PART:+AUTHOR] specification of the piP inside DP in the
structures in (47), regardless of whether movement of #P to
SpecDP happens early or late in the derivation.
This sounds like good news for the analysis of the examples
in (38), repeated below, where first-person agreement in
conjunction with number agreement is obligatory inside the
relative clause.
(38)(a) I, who am tall, was forced to squeeze into that VW
(b) we, who are/∗am tall, were forced to
squeeze into that VW
But the problem for the raising analysis is that it makes
person+number agreement with the head of the relative clause
behave the same way in highest-subject relatives such as those
in (38) and in long-distance relativization cases. As we know
from (39), agreement with the head actually fails in examples of
long relativization.
(39) ∗I, who John says (the FBI thinks) am an
anarchist/responsible,. . .
The fact that long-distance relativization cannot give rise to
person agreement on the finite verb of the clause of which
the head is the subject is unexpected on the raising approach,
assuming that (47) can deliver person agreement in principle. The
head of the relative clause originates, on the raising approach, in
the subject position of the most deeply embedded clause, where
we know that, in the absence of relativization, it would certainly
control person agreement with the finite verb; and we also know
from (38) that in highest-subject relatives the complex structure
in (47) that the raising analysis postulates within the relative
clause manages to control full agreement with the finite verb.
I conclude, based on (39), that at least for non-restrictive
relatives with a first-person head, a raising analysis is
not tenable.22 I will work hereinafter with (44), taken
from Den Dikken (2006).
Feature Sharing Between the Head and the Relative
Clause: Concord
In the structure in (44), the relative clause and the projection of
the head are in a predication relationship. Predication relations
are well-known to give rise to feature sharing between the
predicate and its subject. In the Russian example in (48a),
for instance, the predicative adjective is inflected for the same
gender, number, and case as its subject.23 This feature-sharing
relationship between predicates and their subjects is commonly
referred to as concord. Den Dikken and Dékány (2019) argue
explicitly that concord does not involve the syntactic relationship
of Spec–Head agreement. The short version of the argument is
that concord (unlike Spec–Head agreement) frequently does not
involve complete matching of features: there can be case concord
without ϕ-concord; and there can be ϕ-concord without case
concord. The examples in (48b,c) demonstrate this for Russian.
(48)(a) devocˇka krasivaja (Russian)
girl.F.SG.NOM beautiful.F.SG.NOM
‘the girl is beautiful’
(b) devocˇka byla krasivoj
girl.F.SG.NOM was beautiful.F.SG.INST
‘the girl was beautiful’
(c) eti fakty problema
these fact.M.PL.NOM problem.F.SG.NOM
‘these facts are a problem’
From this, I conclude that concord in predication structures
(RELATOR phrases) does not involve the syntactic relationship of
agreement — it is not a feature-valuation relation but instead a
copying operation, arguably [see esp. (50), below] taking place in
the post-syntactic component (i.e., at PF).
22If one considers connectivity effects (for binding and idiomaticity) to furnish the
only compelling argument for a raising approach to relativization, this conclusion,
in the narrow version of the text formulation, is innocuous: relative clauses with
a first- or second-person head cannot exhibit any such connectivity effects. But if
one considers the distribution of articles with particular noun-phrase types to be a
critical argument for the raising analysis (as Kayne, 1994 does), the text conclusion
is more consequential: (ib) patterns with (ia) in this regard.
(i) (a) the Paris ∗(that I knew as a boy)
(b) the me ∗(that people don’t often see)
Readers who, based on their general theoretical assumptions regarding the locality
restrictions on agreement relations, have a different perspective regarding the
possibility of person and number agreement between the structures in (47) and
the finite verb of the relative clause will still come to the same general conclusion
drawn here, viz., that the raising analysis is not capable of accounting for the person
agreement facts in non-restrictive relative clauses with a first-person pronominal
head. For me, it is (39) rather than (38) that stands out as the problem; but for those
readers who find that (47) cannot control person agreement inside the relative
clause, the problem is (38) rather than (39). Either way, the raising analysis is
bound to run into trouble in the account of (38) vs. (39).
23The Russian examples in this section were kindly provided by Irina
Burukina (p.c.).
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More specifically, for cases of full concord such as (48a), I will
assume that the sum total of the features present on the subject
is copied over to the predicate. In the specific case of a relativized
noun phrase, full concord takes place between the head and the
relative CP in a structure of the type in (44). This causes CP to
have exactly the same ϕ- and case-feature set as the head:
(49) [RP [#P # [NP N]]{ϕ,CASE} [R′ RELATOR [CP RELCLAUSE]{ϕ,CASE}]]
COPYING UNDER CONCORD
Concord targets the full set of features of the head of the
relativized noun phrase as a batch, regardless of where these
features are represented in the internal syntax of the nominal
constituent — blind, that is, to the question of whether the person
feature is represented on the syntactic head of the relativized
nominal or only on its specifier (as in the case of first- and
second-person pronouns). In the post-syntactic component, with
internal syntactic bracketing erased, the head of the relative
clause is one single cluster of features. All of the relativized
head’s features will thus be involved in concord — including
[PART:± AUTHOR].
Since C is the head of CP, by standard feature percolation
along X-bar projection lines this entire feature set is present on
C as well. C and I (i.e., #+pi) are in a feature-sharing relationship
(‘feature inheritance,’ ‘head-head agreement’), so the local I has
the head’s features communicated under concord as well. It is via
this concordial chain that the local I of a highest-subject relative
clause ends up agreeing with the head for all ϕ- and case-features.
This predicts that person agreement between the subject-head
and the finite verb of the relative clause is possible only when the
head has the appropriate case (i.e., nominative): otherwise there is
a clash with I. As we saw in (42) [see again (50a)], this prediction
is borne out, in a structural accusative case context. It is worth
emphasizing that person agreement in the relative clause remains
ungrammatical in environments in which the accusative case
form of the head is not the fruit of a structural case-assignment
relationship but instead the default case (see Schütze, 2001), as in
(50b) (Akmajian, 1970) and (50c) (not previously discussed in the
literature, to my knowledge).
(50)(a) he had the nerve to say that to me, who {has/∗have}
made him what he is today
(b) it is me who {is/∗am} responsible
(c) (A) who’s going to climb up the ladder?
(B) definitely not me, who {has/∗have} vertigo
(B′) me, who {has/∗have} vertigo, climb up that ladder?!
no way!
Neither in it-clefts (50b) nor in fragment answers (50c.B) or ‘Mad
Magazine sentences’ (50c.B′) does the syntax assign structural
accusative case to the pronoun. The accusative case form of
the pronoun is not the exponent of a structural accusative case
feature valued in the course of the syntactic derivation: the default
accusative is a purely phonological (PF) property of the pronouns
in question. Concord is a PF operation, so it copies not just
structural accusatives but also default accusatives over onto the
relative clause and, ultimately, onto the I-head of the relative
clause, which has a nominative case feature. Resulting in a feature
clash at I, the result of this copying is correctly rejected, not just
in (50a) but also in (50b,c).
Unlike concord for person, number agreement between the
head of a highest-subject relative clause and the finite verb is not
ruled out in non-nominative environments [see (41)] because, as
I mentioned in the section entitled “The Featural Specification of
Who as Relative Operator,” the relative operator who is specifiable
for [IND:PL] independently of concord. Person-feature sharing
between the head and the finite verb, by contrast, is entirely
dependent on concord, which entails case-feature identity.24
Though, as we have seen, the concord relationship between
the head of the relativized noun phrase and the relative CP can
stretch all the way down to the I-domain of the relative clause (via
the feature-sharing relation between C and the local I), it cannot
reach beyond this point. It is entirely impossible for concord to
penetrate a clause embedded inside the relative clause: there is no
path from the matrix I down into the subordinate clause along
which the cluster of features of the head could be copied into
the lower clause and reach its I-domain. In non-highest-subject
relative clauses, in fact, the I of the relative clause itself is in a
feature-valuation relationship with the subject of its clause, which
is not the wh-operator linked to the head. So concord between the
head of the relativized noun phrase and the I-domain is restricted
to highest-subject relatives; the I of a clause embedded within the
relative CP cannot be the beneficiary of a concord relationship
between the head and the relative CP.25 This explains the locality
effect seen in (38) vs. (39): I in the lower clause in (39) can only
get default person inflection (‘third person’). Note that, because
who is itself specifiable for [IND:PL], independently of CONCORD,
it is expected that number agreement should be possible in the
downstairs clause — as is indeed the case: (51) is grammatical
(see Douglas, 2015).
(51) we, who John says (the FBI thinks) are
anarchists/responsible,..
24The facts of person agreement in German relative clause constructions are more
complex than the English ones. Heck and Cuartero (2012) report a singular/plural
split for finite verb agreement in relative clauses with a pronominal head: see (i).
It is likely that the form of the relative pronoun plays a role in this, as Heck and
Cuartero (2012) suggest. But the exact way in which the text analysis can mobilize
the form of the German relative pronouns in an analysis of the agreement facts in
(i) is something that I have not figured out at this time.
(i) (a) ∗weil du es bist, der die ganze Arbeit machst (German)
since youSG it are.2SG RELPRON the whole work do.2SG
(b) weil ihr es seid, die die ganze Arbeit macht
since youPL it are.2PL RELPRON the whole work do.2PL
‘since it’s you who do all the work’
25One might ask whether concord between the head and the relative CP is possible
at all when the I-domain is in a feature-valuing Agree relationship with a non-
relativized subject. If C and I engage in an automatic feature-sharing relationship
(‘feature inheritance,’ ‘head-head agreement’) and if feature-sharing between a
head and its maximal projection is likewise automatic (as is standardly assumed:
it is in fact a linchpin of the X-bar principle), it follows that when I is in an
Agree relationship for its ϕ- and case-features with a non-relativized subject, it
is impossible for the head and the relative CP to engage in concord for any
features that do not match those of the subject of the relative clause. I will
accept this conclusion, leaving a fuller investigation of the workings of concord
for another occasion.
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Feature Sharing in Non-subject Relativization: The
Kimball and Aissen Facts Revisited
With the results of the discussion in the previous section in mind,
let us return to the facts noted by Kimball and Aissen (1971)
and Baker (2011):26
(37)(a) I, who Clark {is/∗am} hoping will be the finalist,..
(b) you, who Clark {is/∗are} hoping will be the finalist,..
(c) these people, who Clark {is/!are} hoping will be
the finalists,..
Concord does not help create person agreement in these
kinds of sentences: the I-domain of the relative clause is in an
Agree relationship with the subject of the relative clause (Clark)
in syntax, which values I’s person feature — the DP of Clark
is specified as [–PART]. Concord between the head and the
relative clause could not interfere with this. By the time that
the effects of concord could kick in (at PF), the ϕ-features of
the relative clause’s finite verb have already been fixed. The null
hypothesis is that PF cannot undo or override specifications for
ϕ-features established by valuation under Agree in syntax. So
for (37a,b), concord would come too late: it cannot impose the
head’s [PART:± AUTHOR] specification onto the finite verb of the
relative clause (already valued as [–PART] by Clark) anymore.
Things are different in the case of number, for which the
relative operator who is inherently specifiable. The feature
[IND:PL] can be present on who in the syntax of the relative clause,
and under the right circumstances, it can impose itself on the
finite verb of the relative clause. There are, logically speaking,
three points in the structure at which number agreement between
the finite verb and who could come about in the case of (37c): in
CP, under Spec–Head agreement; in IP, with who as an adjunct to
or outer specifier of IP (in the case of densely successive-cyclic
movement), again under a form of Spec–Head agreement; or
under (downward) Agree, when the wh-operator is adjoined to
the phase in the complement of I. In each of these configurations,
the finite verb should be able to establish a feature-valuation
relationship with who’s [IND:PL]. For my purposes in this paper,
it does not matter which of these options is the right one. I will
leave the matter open.27
26The unusual agreement pattern in (37c) is particularly well-known for cases of
relativization, but Kimball and Aissen (1971) themselves also report such effects
for root wh-questions: recall (13b). I will turn to this at the end of this section.
Note in this connection as well that Hartsuiker et al. (2001) point out agreement
attraction effects triggered by objects in Dutch SOV constructions.
27General assumptions regarding the directionality of syntactic structure building
(see Den Dikken, 2018 and references cited there) will make particular approaches
to the way in which who in (37c) establishes its number agreement relation with
the finite verb more plausible than others. But this is not the place to delve into
these matters.
All three approaches can, it seems to me, account for Kimball and Aissen’s
(1971) observation that number agreement between the non-subject relative
operator and the finite verb cannot happen when the subject of the relative clause is
non-pronominal: (i). There are good grounds for believing that weak pronominal
arguments must establish a Spec–Head relationship with the verb (as witness,
for instance, the fact that object shift, which establishes a Spec–Head relation,
is obligatory, in languages that have it, whenever the object is a weak pronoun).
Forging an agreement relationship between who and the finite verb (whether it be
via the Spec–Head relation or under Agree) would make it impossible for he to
engage in a Spec–Head agreement relationship with the inflectional system of the
relative clause.
One thing that I think is worth noting is that the
ungrammaticality of are in (37b) not only confirms that
person agreement is impossible in Kimball and Aissen-style
constructions but also compels us to be precise about the
number-matching relationship between the head of the relative
clause and who, the relative operator. The null hypothesis for
English you, whose form does not covary with the number
of addressees, is that its morphological feature specification is
constant regardless of its reference. Since you, when it is itself
the subject of a finite verb, always triggers a plural form of the
verb (also in the case of the copula: you are), this leads Kayne
(2000) to assume that you is morphologically plural even in
contexts of singular reference. Adopting this assumption leads
to the conclusion that the number specification for the operator
who in the relative clause is based on semantic numerosity, not
morphological number. We know from (37c) that who, when
specified as [IND:PL], is capable of controlling plural agreement
in the relative clause. The fact, then, that plural agreement on
the finite verb (are, the blanket plural form of the present-tense
copula) is impossible in (37b) tells us that English you, when
it has a singular referent [as is clear in (37b) from the form of
the predicate nominal, the finalist], cannot be construed with
[IND:PL]-specified who in the relative clause. The data in (52)
(from Douglas, 2015, p. 36) make the same point for highest-
subject relatives:
(52)(a) he had the nerve to say that to youSG, who {has/∗have}
made him what he is today
(b) he had the nerve to say that to youPL, who {have/∗has}
made him what he is today.
In highest-subject relatives with a non-nominative pronominal
head (where person agreement is impossible, for reasons
discussed in “Feature Sharing Between the Head and the Relative
Clause: Concord”), there is a clear difference between (52a) (with
a single addressee) and (52b) (with a plurality of addressees) in
the inflection on the finite verb. We know from (42) that person
agreement with the pronominal head is excluded when the head
is in a non-nominative environment (because concord between
the head and the C–I cluster of the relative clause would result in
a case clash in this context); so have in (52b) is a reflex of number
agreement alone, between the finite verb and the relative operator
who. The question is what determines the number specification
of this who.
(i) these people, who he {is/∗are} hoping will be the finalists, ..
I would like to point out in this context that though Dillon et al. (2017, p. 81) did
find ‘a non-significant numerical trend’ in this direction in object wh-questions
(such as which basketball players {is/!are} he planning to use this season?), they
‘failed to observe any interaction of subject type [pronoun vs. lexical noun
phrase; MdD] and the mismatch effect.’ In their conclusion (p. 90), however,
they call attention to the fact that the approach to the attraction facts that they
favor ‘predicts that highly marked controllers should outcompete less marked
controllers, minimizing the amount of interference they contribute. Intuition
suggests that this prediction is correct’ — based on examples of the type in (ii)
[their (9), not explicitly tested in any of their experiments], involving a first-person
singular subject.
(ii) which flowers (am/∗are) I planting in the garden today?
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If, as Kayne (2000) argues, you is always morphologically
plural, the fact that ‘singular you’ resists construal with plural who
is surprising if the number specification for who is determined on
the basis of morphological feature matching. After all, ‘singular
you’ then has what it takes, morphologically, to license plural
who. This does not necessarily mean, however, that Kayne’s
morphological analysis of you is ill-founded (which is what
Douglas, 2015, p. 36 takes the facts in (52) to show). What the ill-
formedness of are in (37b) and the distribution of has and have in
(52) show, on Kayne’s approach to you, is that the determination
of the number specification for the relative operator who is based,
not on the morphological number specification (i.e., the [IND]-
feature) of the head of the relative clause, but on the numerosity
of the referent of the head of the relative clause. Succinctly put, on
Kayne’s analysis of English you, these inflection facts would have
to be a reflex of ‘semantic agreement.’ The question of whether
‘semantic agreement’ exists and how it works is by no means
an easy one to answer (see, e.g., Wechsler, 2011 and references
cited there). I will not take a stand on the matter because it
is orthogonal to my concerns in this paper. But the lie of the
land is clear: for those who believe independently that ‘semantic
agreement’ exists and is applicable in the context of relativization,
the facts reviewed above do not pose a threat to Kayne’s (2000)
argument that English you is always grammatically plural; but
to those who reject ‘semantic agreement’ (in general, or in the
specific context at hand), these facts suggest that English has two
homophonous forms of the second-person pronoun you, only
one of them morphologically specified as [IND:PL].
One final remark is in order. I have argued in this section
that concord is not at play in Kimball and Aissen-style number
agreement cases of the type in (37c), nor in examples such
as (52b): the plural number inflection of the finite verb is
determined in these cases by the [IND:PL] of who itself. This leads
us to expect that plural agreement cases of these types should
be replicable in wh-questions as well, with wh-operators that are
specified as [IND:PL]. Consider the pair in (53)–(54):
(53) which people {are/∗is} hoping Clark will be a finalist?
(54) which people {is/!are} Clark hoping will be finalists?
The wh-phrase which people[IND:PL] of course controls plural
agreement with the finite verb of the wh-question when serving
as its subject, as in (53). But Kimball and Aissen (1971, p. 245)
already showed that wh-questions can also give rise to agreement
attraction, as shown in (54) (recall also (13)). Interestingly,
however, Richard Kayne tells me that he rejects such agreement
in questions with who, even when who is construed through
predication with an explicitly plural nominal in the lower clause,
as in who {does/*do} Clark think will be the finalists?. This should
be investigated further: it is likely to be revealing regarding the
precise circumstances (incl. possible locality restrictions) under
which a [IND:PL] specification can be assigned to the bare wh-
operator who under concord.
Dillon et al. (2017) report on a recent series of experiments
they ran on Kimball and Aissen-effects in English wh-questions.28
28In their title and in various places throughout their paper, they refer to this
as ‘object agreement.’ But as is clear from cases of the type in (54) (where the
Their results show that although ‘mismatch effects are largest
when the wh-object is adjacent to the verb’ (p. 86), string
adjacency between the finite verb and the wh-constituent is
nonetheless ‘neither necessary nor sufficient to generate a
mismatch effect’ (p. 85). The answer to the question of whether
the structural subject or the wh-constituent controls finite verb
agreement turns out to be determined for the most part by
syntactic (configurational) factors. Dillon et al. (2017) review
the spectrum of extant theoretical approaches to agreement
attraction errors (in terms of feature transmission, subject
confusion, and syntactic interference), and the results of their
extensive empirical studies land them on the side of syntactic
interference approaches such as Franck et al. (2006). This is
a conclusion I welcome. However, Dillon and colleagues also
caution that the role played by the Spec–Head relation may be
less robust than Franck and colleagues (and the present paper)
have made it out to be: in particular, Dillon et al. (2017, p. 80)
‘failed to find any reliable effect of preposition fronting on [their]
ratings’ — agreement attraction was rated roughly equally in
(55a) and (55b):
(55)(a) which trees {is/!are} the hiker resting under?
(b) under which trees {is/!are} the hiker resting?
Future research should look into this at greater length,
against the background of syntactic analyses of PP pied-piping
(see esp. Heck, 2008 for important discussion of the syntax
of pied-piping).
Beyond the P-stranding/PP pied-piping dichtomy, Dillon
et al.’s (2017) study leaves room for additional experimentation
regarding the nature and scope of Kimball and Aissen-style
effects as well. I would particularly encourage future work that
juxtaposes wh-relatives and wh-questions in a way that makes
them more directly comparable. All of and colleagues five
acceptability-judgment experiments involve ROOT wh-questions,
with subject–auxiliary inversion, which maneuvres the finite verb
into a position in between the wh-constituent (in SpecCP) and
the structural subject (in SpecIP). This makes these wh-questions
different from relative clause constructions, which do not feature
movement of the finite verb to C. A direct comparison of wh-
relatives with NON-ROOT wh-questions, leveling the playing field
with regard to the placement of the finite verb, would be able
to tell us with more precision whether the ‘Kimball and Aissen
effect’ is the same or different, qualitatively and/or quantitatively,
in relatives and wh-questions.
Summary
After this (unavoidably) rather elaborate discussion of agreement
in relative clause constructions, let me summarize our findings in
this section regarding person versus number agreement.
I started out by giving an explicit syntax for the representation
of person inside the noun phrase and on the clausal spine. For
first- and second-person pronouns, a structure was presented
in which person (pi) projects a phrase occupying the specifier
controller of finite verb agreement in the matrix clause is not an object of that
clause but instead the subject of the subordinate finite clause), this term should not
be taken too literally.
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position of number (#). This not only gives us a natural syntax
for pronoun–noun constructions such as us linguists, but also
paves the way for an explanation for the range of ways in
which person behaves differently from number in the realm of
agreement phenomena. Effectively, whenever person agreement
is possible in syntax, it comes about in a configuration that is
similar to the number agreement attraction effect seen in !these
people’s identity are to remain a secret. Both can materialize
only when the subject is in a Spec–Head relation with the
inflectional cluster on the clausal spine. This gives us an account
of the majority of person agreement contexts, and explains the
restrictiveness of person agreement in comparison to number
agreement (without, however, giving person agreement the flavor
of an attraction error).
For cases of person agreement between the pronominal head
of a relativized noun phrase and the finite verb inside the relative
clause, an appeal to a feature-sharing relationship different from
Agree or Spec–Head agreement needed to be exploited: concord,
a post-syntactic copying operation. The feature bundle of the
head of the relativized noun phrase can be copied wholesale
onto its predicate (the relative clause), and can make it from
there to the inflectional cluster of the relative clause, but not
beyond. Via this feature-copying process, full feature-sharing
between the head and the finite verb becomes possible in highest-
subject relatives — but not in long-distance subject relativization
constructions, nor in cases of non-subject relativization. Number
agreement between the finite verb of the relative clause and
the head is always possible, giving rise to attraction effects
in the case of long-distance and non-subject relativization, à
la Kimball and Aissen (1971). That number never comes up
empty-handed is thanks to the fact that the English relative
pronoun who is specifiable for plural number (probably under
‘semantic agreement,’ as discussed in “Feature Sharing in Non-
subject Relativization: The Kimball and Aissen Facts Revisited”).
But as a DP, who is not specifiable for first- or second-person:
[PART: ± AUTHOR] is exclusively the province of a piP in the
specifier position of #P.
The main effects of SCOPA have now been
successfully derived.29
29What Baker (2011) calls ‘two-and-a-half agreement’ (found in ditransitive
constructions in which V agrees for all ϕ-features with the subject and the
indirect object but cannot agree for person with the direct object) falls out from
the text proposal: the direct object of a ditransitive, unlike the subject and the
indirect object, is never in a Spec–Head relation with the verb. Baker’s (2011, sect.
3.1) analysis of partial agreement in Sakha is also directly compatible with my
derivation of SCOPA.
I will not talk here about the fact that a Spanish predicate adjective can
reflect the number and gender features of its subject but never its person feature
[Spanish somos gorda(∗mo)s ‘we are fat’]. Baker derives this from SCOPA; for
me this does not involve agreement but concord, which for reasons unknown
to me can only be partial in this context. For the apparent person mismatch
in Spanish ‘unagreement’ constructions (los profesores somos inteligentes ‘the
professors are.1PL intelligent’), DP-internal predication between the common
noun phrase and a silent pronoun (contributing ‘1PL’) is plausible. Mancini et al.
(2014a) present three eye-tracking experiments and a grammaticality judgment
task contrasting Spanish ‘unagreement’ cases and erroneous person agreement,
showing that although ‘[s]imilarly to Person Mismatch, Unagreement elicited an
early negative effect, suggesting rapid recognition of a subject–verb mismatch
..., [a]t later stages, the effect of true person anomalies persisted, while the
CONCLUSION
The empirical spotlight in this paper has been on ‘out of
the ordinary’ agreement phenomena and the circumstances
under which they are found in Universal Grammar. A key
property common to all ‘agreement attraction’ and ‘long-distance
agreement’ cases is that they cannot involve first- or second-
person. It is this person restriction (hitherto poorly understood)
that has been at center-stage here.
Baker’s, (2008, 2011) SCOPA captures the specialness of
person, but because it is a condition that is itself left underived,
it cannot explain it. I have derived SCOPA from (a) the syntactic
representation of person in the noun phrase (with person
structurally represented as a specifier) and on the clausal spine
(with person and number each projecting X-bar structures,
the former’s phrase embedded in the latter’s) and (b) the
workings of agreement and concord. Central to the syntax of
(b) is a distinction between (downward) Agree and Spec–Head
agreement, with only the latter capable of effecting number and
person agreement conjointly.
This, in combination with the representation of person in the
internal structure of pronouns, successfully rules out all person
agreement attraction and long-distance person agreement, as
desired. The Spec–Head relation creates just the sort of niche
needed for person agreement where it is legal.
With Franck et al. (2006), this paper thus affirms the existence
of two syntactic mechanisms for the establishment of ϕ-feature
agreement: Agree and the Spec–Head relation. Agree is more
liberal in the sense that it can potentially establish long-distance
agreement dependencies, whereas Spec–Head relations are by
definition more local. But in another way, Agree is also more
restrictive: it is impossible for an Agree-probe to target a subpart
of a specifier in its c-command domain; so whenever we find
agreement dependencies between a head and a subpart of a
specifier (including cases of person agreement with subjects), a
Spec–Head configuration must be involved.
Mancini et al. (2017) also argue for the postulation of two
different mechanisms involved in agreement phenomena, which
they call ‘feature-checking’ and ‘feature-mapping.’30 Number and
person agreement are argued to involve a common ϕ-feature-
checking mechanism (‘of which the similar left-anterior negative
effect could be evidence’; p. 142) but to differ in their feature-
mapping options, with number mapping to cardinality and
person to the discourse (‘which would be behind the different
posterior negative effect elicited by the two violations’; p. 142).
I have little to add to Mancini and her co-workers’ findings
regarding the interpretive side of person marking (what they
call ‘feature-mapping’), and find their interpretation thereof
(which appeals to the representation of the speaker and the
hearer in the left periphery) eminently plausible. For the
discussion in the present paper, this is of no immediate concern.
patterning of Unagreement with Standard Agreement clearly evidenced that the
grammaticality of the apparent mismatch had been acknowledged’ (p. 143).
30Mancini et al. (2017) is currently the most recent installment in a series of
psycho- and neuro-linguistic studies conducted by Mancini et al. (2011; 2014a;
2014b, for earlier reports), all of which have found significant differences in
behavior between number agreement and person agreement.
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More to the point of the current discussion is Mancini et al.’s
(2017) conclusion that number and person agreement share
the same feature-checking mechanism. If what I have argued
in the foregoing is on target, the feature-checking processes
involved in number and person agreement are not, in fact,
systematically identical: while number agreement is possible
under both Agree and the Spec–Head relation, the facts reviewed
above suggest that person agreement is established exclusively
under the Spec–Head relation. The neurological measurements
reported in Mancini and colleagues work do not suggest that
there is a grammatical-processual difference between number
and person agreement — but this may very well be an effect of
the choice of constructions and languages studied: preverbal and
silent subjects in Romance pro-drop languages (Italian, Spanish).
It is likely that preverbal subjects and pro-dropped subjects in
these languages are systematically in a Spec–Head relation with
the T-head. Recall that both number and person agreement
are possible under the Spec–Head relation. To probe into the
question of whether the feature-checking mechanism(s) involved
in person and number agreement are neurologically different, one
would need to look at data like the ones studied in the present
paper. These data define a research agenda that can take the
interesting results of the work done by Mancini’s team further.
The picture resulting from the present paper (in particular,
the division of labor between Agree, the Spec–Head relation,
and the post-syntactic copying operation called concord) is
principled and descriptively adequate in the complex realm of
agreement attraction and long-distance agreement constructions
discussed in this paper. The attractions of agreement are a
boundless resource for morphosyntacticians. My hope is that the
perspectives on the workings of agreement and the structural
representation of the ϕ-features within the noun phrase will
prove their mettle well beyond the range of facts reviewed here.
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